|
Clearinghouse on Educational Policy and Management
|
| College of Education · University of Oregon |
|
Trends and Issues: School Choice
Intersectional Choice PlansPublic Voucher PlansThe concept of educational vouchers originated in the early 1960s, when Milton Friedman argued that vouchers would improve educational efficiency. Parents would be given vouchers equal to the per-pupil expenditure in the public schools. These vouchers could be used at whichever school parents wished their children to attend, whether public or private. In 1971, while working on California's famous Serrano case, law students Jack Coons and Stephen Sugarman recommended that vouchers be used for students in poor districts to remedy unconstitutional school-funding inequities (Miller 1999). Voucher plans have been criticized on legal and equity grounds, as the following discussion makes clear. In 1969, the Office of Economic Opportunity launched the Alum Rock (California) voucher project, which eventually became a limited open-enrollment program. The problem was that most of the parents (as in many other studies) preferred neighborhood schools instead of alternative schools. In sum, neither school personnel nor parents acted the way free-market theory predicted they would (Ascher 1996). Arnold Fege, director of government relations for the National PTA, views the voucher issue as a "battle for public resources, with $386 billion at stake" and a private sector anxious to grab its share (Saks 1997). For others, the key public issue is deciding who has the right to spend the money—public providers or the consumers themselves? Public Opinion PollsIn the September 2001 Phi Delta Kappa/Gallup Poll (Rose and Gallup 2001), 62 percent of respondents opposed allowing parent to choose a private school for their children to attend at public expense, compared with 56 percent the previous year, and 34 percent were in favor, compared with 39 percent in 2000. Opposition declined between 1993 and 1998, but has gradually increased since fall 1999, when 55 percent opposed public vouchers and 41 percent favored them. In both the 1998 and 1999 Phi Delta Kappa/Gallup Polls (Rose and Gallup 1998, 1999), 51 percent of the public said they would favor a proposal for total or partial government tuition to send their children to private or church-related schools. In 2000 and 2001, public approval declined to 45 and 44 percent, respectively. In 1999, 61 percent of public-school parents favored such plans, compared with 56 percent in 1998. By 2001, public-school parents’ approval had dropped to 52 percent. In 1999, 74 percent of the public believed that private schools accepting public funds should be required to admit students from wider backgrounds and ability levels; 77 percent believed that publicly supported private or church-related schools should be as accountable to the state as public schools are. In 2001, public and parental support for making publicly supported private schools as accountable as public schools was the highest ever, at 82 and 83 percent, respectively. Additionally, both the general public and public-school parents (72 and 73 percent, respectively) solidly support reforming the existing public-school system over seeking alternatives to it. For the first time in these polls’ thirty-three-year history, "a majority of respondents assign either an A or a B to the schools in their communities"(Rose and Gallup 2001). These sentiments are echoed in three other polls. Public Policy Forum. According to a Public Policy Forum survey, Ohio and Wisconsin taxpayers "favor expanding voucher programs in their states that involve private schools, but believe those schools should be held accountable to the public" (Schnaiberg, February 18, 1998). Respondents identified the need for guidelines that would (1) require choice schools to make public their missions, philosophies, governance structures, curricula, and other relevant characteristics; (2) create public boards to publicize school information; and (3) revoke taxpayer money if they fail to meet reporting requirements. Hart Research Associates. In 1998, a Peter D. Hart Research Associates Poll was commissioned by the American Federation of Teachers and administered to a random sample of over 800 respondents (Peter D. Hart Research Associates Poll 1998). Although support for the notion of "allowing students and parents to choose a private school to attend at public expense" drew mixed responses (38 in favor and 54 percent opposed), "support for accountability was overwhelming." More than 80 percent favored requiring schools to meet basic curriculum and teacher-qualification standards. Voucher schools would also have to avoid racial and religious discrimination, meet health and safety conditions, employ only certified teachers, disclose their budgets, use the same tests as public schools, and comply with the Americans with Disabilities Education Act. Zogby. A poll of 1,211 adults (including an oversample of African-Americans) conducted by Utica-base Zogby International found only "paper-thin" support for vouchers (National School Boards Association News Release, September 25, 2001). In this telephone poll, "a huge majority of those surveyed, up to 90 percent, say that private schools accepting vouchers must meet the same accountability standards as public schools" (NSBA News Release 2001). Although equal proportions of those surveyed (48 percent) favored or opposed vouchers, nearly 40 percent of supporters would "withdraw their support if it results in a loss of tax dollars to public schools" (NSBA 2001). Also, 57 percent of African-American respondents opposed vouchers, and 41 percent favored them. Just 12 percent of all adults and only 5 percent of African-Americans surveyed selected vouchers as the best way to improve public schools; respondents clearly preferred that "tax dollars be invested in strategies such as reducing class sizes and strengthening teacher quality." Public Agenda. Yet another poll, Public Agenda's (2000) comprehensive survey of national attitudes on public-school alternatives, cautions against misreading public views on vouchers and charter schools. The vast majority of citizens, including many Milwaukee and Cleveland residents, know little about these educational alternatives. Legislative Action and ReferendaOn the legislative front, voucher proposals were defeated in Congress and in Washington, Oregon, Colorado, Texas, and California during the mid-1990s (Saks 1997, Johnston 1997) and more recently in New Mexico and Pennsylvania (Pipho 2000). In June 1999, the Florida legislature enacted a statewide voucher system for up to 150,000 disadvantaged students attending schools rated as "failing" (Elam 1999). At least twenty-five states introduced voucher bills during the 1999-2000 session (Pipho 2000 ). Aggressive, ongoing campaigns were being waged in Michigan, Colorado, Texas, Pennsylvania, California, New Mexico, Vermont, and Washington (Johnston 1997; Bowman, March 1, 2000). At least seven of these states echoed Florida's approach—using school performance and accountability arguments (rather than pleas for fairness and increased choice for poor families) to justify voucher proposals (Bowman, March 1, 2000). In fall 2000, Michigan and California voters defeated voucher proposals by wide margins. At the polling booth, Americans are not showing tax support for parochial or private schools (Menendez 1999). Since 1966, this issue has been rejected twenty-three out of the twenty-four times it was considered by the electorate. Various voucher/tax-credit schemes have been rejected by two-thirds of voters in twelve out of thirteen states and the District of Columbia. The exception was South Dakota. Legislatures in Minnesota, Arizona, and Iowa have enacted education tax-credit plans (See Tax Credits and Deductions section) (Fuller and others 1999). Constitutionality IssuesThe best-known publicly funded voucher programs—in Milwaukee, Wisconsin; Cleveland, Ohio; and Florida—have been subjected to court scrutiny in recent years, culminating in the June 2002 Supreme Court decision that Cleveland’s voucher program is constitutional. Milwaukee, Wisconsin. The Milwaukee Parental Choice Program (MCPC) began in 1990. It offered $2,900 in private-school tuition for children from low-income families. Religious schools were added to the program in 1995 (Walsh, October 3, 2001). By 2002, voucher amounts had increased to over $5,000, and enrollment reached nearly 11,000 students at 106 schools (Norquist 2002). In June 1998, the Milwaukee State Supreme Court, based on Agostini v. Felton (a U.S. Supreme Court ruling allowing Title I aid to disadvantaged parochial-school students), upheld the program's inclusion of religious schools (Walsh, April 15, 1998). The court ruled that "the amended MPCP does not violate the Establishment Clause because it has a secular purpose, it will not have the primary effect of advancing religion, and it will not lead to excessive entanglement between the state and participating sectarian schools" (Excerpt from the ruling; Walsh, April 15, 1998). In November 1998, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to review the Wisconsin ruling—a disappointment for critics and advocates alike (McCarthy 2000). It agreed, however, to review the Cleveland program and ruled in June 2002 that it was constitutional. Cleveland, Ohio. Enacted by the Ohio Legislature, the Cleveland Scholarship and Tutoring Program was implemented in 1996 in response to low academic scores in the city’s schools. This program targets low-income families, has embraced religious schools from its inception, and provides tutoring assistance. By 1997-98, vouchers worth up to $2,250 were available for 4,000 K-5 students (Metcalf and Tait) in 56 private schools, 46 of which are religious (Archer, January 12, 2000). In 2000, "about 96 percent of the students were using the vouchers to attend religiously affiliated schools" (Walsh, October 3, 2001). Because the overwhelming majority of the schools funded by the public program were sectarian, Cleveland residents filed a lawsuit declaring it a violation of the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause. Voucher proponents asserted that the program did not endorse religious schools per se because it left up to the participants the choice of which school to attend, whether religious or nonreligious. The case challenged that claim, stating that, as a matter of practice, the $2,250 tuition limit was enough to cover only the fees of religious schools, which often receive additional support from private donations and consequently have lower tuition needs than independent nonsectarian private schools (Biskupic and Henry, June 27, 2002). After a state appeals court ruled that the program violates federal and state bans on government aid to religious institutions, the case ended up in the Ohio Supreme Court. In December 1999, U.S. District Judge Solomon Oliver, Jr., ruled that the Cleveland plan "violates the U.S. Constitution's ban on a government establishment of religion" (Archer, January 12, 2000). Cleveland took the case to the U.S. Sixth Court of Appeals, which upheld the Ohio Supreme Court’s ruling. In June 2002, in the last ruling on the last day of the annual session, a divided panel of the U.S. Supreme Court delivered its decision for what had been the most controversial case of the year. The High Court’s conservative majority, headed by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, prevailed in a 5–4 ruling that Cleveland’s voucher program does not constitute the establishment of religion and is therefore constitutional (Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, Hanna Perkins School v. Simmons-Harris, Taylor v. Simmons-Harris.). Rehnquist announced that the Court found that Cleveland’s program was "one of true private choice" that is "neutral in all respects toward religion" because participants still have the option of attending a public school, magnet school, or nonreligious private school (Zelman et al. v. Simmons-Harris et al.). He received the complete backing of Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, who was widely expected to be the swing vote in the case because she had qualified her earlier support of the majority stance by insisting on the distinction between programs that send funds directly into religiously affiliated institutions—giving the appearance that the government endorses religion—and those that give the money to individuals and let them decide where to spend it (Fletcher, February 20, 2002). Some had expected her to limit the impact of the case by including some provisos in a separate assenting opinion, but no such caveats were made (Biskupic and Henry, June 27, 2002). Justices Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, and Clarence Thomas joined Rehnquist and O’Connor in the decision (Zelman et al. v. Simmons-Harris et al.). The High Court has given increasing amounts of leeway in cases involving the diversion of public funds to religious schools within the past several decades. In 1968, it ruled that the government could supply nonreligious textbooks to private school students (Schulte, June 28, 2002). Eighteen years later, it approved one student’s use of a state vocational scholarship to attend a religious institution to become a pastor. And in 1993, it decided that federal money can pay for sign-language interpreters for deaf students at parochial schools. Rehnquist asserted that the Court’s ruling in the Cleveland voucher case is consistent with that line of precedents (Lane, June 28, 2002). Among the dissenters in the Court’s liberal minority was Justice David Souter, who lamented the decision to support a program he feels forces taxpayers to subsidize faiths other than their own while corrupting religious institutions by making them dependent on government funds and opening the door to future government interference (Lane, June 28, 2002). Several religious groups, including the Council on Religious Freedom and the Seventh-Day Adventist Church State Council, oppose the decision on the same grounds (Biskupic and Henry, June 27, 2002). Justice Stephen Breyer pointed out that the ruling may not even help the low-income students for whom it was intended, if their only choice is between an inadequate public school and a private school that teaches religious beliefs contrary to their own (Biskupic and Henry, June 27, 2002). Souter and Breyer were joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and John Paul Stevens (Zelman et al. v. Simmons-Harris et al.). The Supreme Court’s ruling has breathed new life into the campaign for voucher programs across America by putting the constitutionality question to rest. President George W. Bush, whose support gave a significant boost to Cleveland’s case, called the ruling a "landmark victory," comparing its importance to the Brown v. Board of Education case that called for the desegregation of American schools in 1954 (Milbank, July 2, 2002). The Supreme Court, which approved the constitutionality of only those voucher programs similar to Cleveland’s, has passed the issue into the hands of state legislatures across the United States. The eight states in which advocates invest the most hope for passing voucher laws are Minnesota, Colorado, Texas, Arizona, Indiana, Virginia, Alabama, and Utah (Frieden, June 27, 2002). And only a few hours after the delivery of the Supreme Court’s decision, House Majority Leader Rep. Richard Armey (R-Tex.) reintroduced a bill to institute a voucher program in Washington, D.C., that is identical to one that was passed by Congress in 1997 but vetoed by then-president Bill Clinton (Schulte, June 28, 2002). Many states’ constitutions have their own clauses establishing the separation of church and state, so the constitutionality question may arise again in state supreme courts, though the High Court’s precedent will be difficult to supersede. Florida. A plan enacted by the Florida Legislature in June 1999 could qualify "as many as 150,000 of the state's 2.3 million K-12 public school students for vouchers," at a cost of $750 million (Elam 1999). The Opportunity Scholarship Program "allows children in schools deemed failing by the state for two years out of four to receive vouchers to attend other public schools or private schools, including religious ones" (Walsh, October 3, 2001). The program was temporarily derailed by a March 2000 decision by Florida circuit court Judge L. Ralph Smith, who found that "giving students taxpayer-financed vouchers for private-school tuition" violated the Florida Constitution’s guarantee of a "uniform, efficient, safe, secure, and high-quality system of free public schools" (Wilgoren 2000). In October 2000, a three-member state appellate panel overturned Judge Smith’s decision and reinstated the program (Sack 2001). In April 2001, the Florida Supreme Court declined to review a case challenging the program, letting stand the appellate court’s decision. So far, only fifty-eight students (from failing Pensacola schools) have used vouchers for private schools; seventy-eight students transferred to other public schools (Walsh, October 3, 2001). A separate program, also enacted in 1999, "provides vouchers permitting disabled students to attend private schools or out-of-district public schools"; about 4,000 are expected to take advantage of the program during 2001-02. Maine and Vermont. In Maine and Vermont towns lacking high schools, informal voucher plans have allowed secondary students to attend public schools or approved private schools outside their home districts since the 1870s (McCarthy 2000, Walsh 2001e). In both states, higher courts have turned back citizens' efforts to add religious schools to the list of options (McCarthy; Mathis and Merriam 1998; Walsh, October 20, 1999). The experiences of these five states suggest that including parochial schools in voucher plans is extremely controversial—especially because 80 percent of private schools have religious ties (Hadderman 2000). The High Court's increasingly relaxed interpretation of the establishment clause is no guarantee that voucher proponents will prevail. As Wilgoren notes, " vouchers could still be blocked by state constitutional promises of a free public education." States with "Blaine Amendment" type laws that forbid public funding of sectarian schools will offer tough resistance (Viteritti 1998). Ironically, laws that "erupted out of a spirit of religious bigotry" seeking to promote Protestantism in public schools in the early twentieth century "eventually became an emblem of religious freedom" (or, as some have said, freedom from religion) in some states. Courts do exercise discretion. In Arizona, for example, the state supreme court's 1999 decision upholding tax credits to benefit private-school scholarship funds overlooked a Blaine-like constitutional provision forbidding tax support of religious schools (Walsh, October 13, 1999). Research ResultsDisagreement in Milwaukee. In 1996, researchers examining the Milwaukee choice program drew diametrically opposite conclusions. A study by Jay P. Greene and Paul E. Peterson "contradicts 5 years' worth of evaluations by John Witte and his colleagues at the University of Wisconsin-Madison" (Saks 1997). Witte's evaluations found no achievement differences between voucher and comparable public-school students for any given year. Comparing selected students with those not selected for the voucher program, Greene and Peterson found that voucher students' third- and fourth-year reading scores were 3 to 5 percentage points higher, and their math scores were 5 and 12 percentage points higher. The validity of both studies has been under attack. Voucher opponents have championed Witte's findings as proof of vouchers' failings. Proponents have trumpeted Greene and Peterson's findings as demonstrating vouchers' effectiveness. Different research designs have complicated efforts to evaluate these studies objectively. In 1997, the Milwaukee data were reanalyzed by Cecilia Rouse of Princeton University (Fuller and others 1999). Comparing annual gains for a larger sample of voucher students with both Milwaukee Public School students and students denied admission to the voucher program, she "found a modest gain of 1.5 to 2.3 percentile points per year in math for the voucher students, but no statistically significant differences in reading scores." Rouse's methodology apparently overcame some weaknesses of Greene's analysis, but did not fully compensate for selection bias (contributions of family and home factors) (Fuller and others). Expanding her study, Rouse examined Milwaukee student-achievement data in the city’s magnet schools, regular attendance area schools, and a group of attendance area schools with small class sizes and supplemental state funding (the P-5 schools). She "found that the P-5 schools performed as well or better than students in choice schools" (Molnar 2000; Rouse 1998). Confusion in Cleveland. Preliminary evaluations of the Cleveland Scholarship Program have been equally contentious. A study by Jay P. Greene, Paul E. Peterson, and William G. Howell "found achievement gains among students at 2 out of 55 schools in the program, while a report from the American Federation of Teachers called the study a 'cruel hoax' " (Viadero, August 6, 1997). According to Greene and associates (1997), K-3 students at two specially created private schools gained "5 percentile points on the reading test and 15 percentage points in math." The AFT claims that "testing students from fall to spring exaggerates student gains." Others, such as Harvard University education professor Richard Elmore, argue that such testing is valid. The AFT also claimed that students at existing private schools "had crowded out some public school students who wanted to attend those schools" (Viadero, August 6, 1997). Preliminary results from a state-commissioned study led by Kim Metcalf of Indiana University showed that 94 third-grade voucher recipients did no better academically than 449 third-graders of similar background who attend Cleveland Public Schools (Walsh, April 15, 1998). However, Metcalf did find "somewhat higher achievement of fourth-grade choice students in science and language" (Drury 2000). Interestingly, achievement results varied from school to school. "Students attending private schools established before the introduction of vouchers were largely responsible for the achievement advantage of voucher students"; those attending the newly established Hope academies (contrary to Paul Peterson and associates’ findings) "actually scored lower than their counterparts in the Cleveland Public Schools" (Drury 2000). A more recent study by Metcalf found a slight edge for Cleveland voucher students after three years of school (Johnston, September 12, 2001, Ohio Department of Education 2001). The study "examined performance of a randomly selected group of 894 scholarship recipients and public school students" who began kindergarten in 1998. Metcalf found that scholarship students were performing at higher levels in math, reading, and language by first grade. By the spring of their second-grade year, "public-school students had closed the performance gap in all areas" (ODE website). However, scholarship students who remained in the program for three full years "continue to perform slightly higher." Other Studies. Analyzing several evaluations of the Cleveland and Milwaukee programs and a privately funded New York City scholarship program, WestEd researchers found consistent, generally positive results regarding inclusion of low-income families, parent satisfaction, parent education levels, parent marital status, family size, race-ethnicity, and attrition and mobility (Adelsheimer 1999). Researchers' findings were inconsistent regarding student achievement and parent involvement. On October 1, 2001, the U.S. General Accounting Office issued a report stating that "research doesn’t provide a definitive answer on whether publicly financed tuition voucher programs in Cleveland and Milwaukee have raised student achievement" (Zehr 2001). The GAO reviewed research conducted by state-contracted evaluation teams and independent researchers, focusing on standardized test results and excluding issues of student and parental satisfaction. Findings were inconclusive, according to the GAO, because "researchers found different results when they used different methods to compensate for weaknesses in the data" (Zehr 2001). Inadequate enrollment and test-score information for the Milwaukee program added up to too many unknowns. Implementation ChallengesOperational Obstacles in Ohio. One major challenge to publicly funded voucher programs involves transportation—the Cleveland program's biggest headache, besides bureaucratic opposition, according to program director Bert Holt (Archer, June 9, 1999). Because of insufficient funding, voucher students had to be transported by cab drivers (who overcharged for their services) to private schools. This oversight resulted in the legislature's approval of an additional $2.9 million in state aid for the voucher program and a prompt amendment of the voucher law to include school-bus transportation. Monitoring has also been problematic in Cleveland's charter and voucher programs. In January 2000, a state audit "charged that the now-defunct Islamic Academy School of Arts and Sciences had taken $70,000 from the Cleveland voucher program for students who did not attend the school" (Archer, January 19, 2000). There are administrative problems surrounding approval of vouchers for higher income families. More oversight is being planned for all Ohio choice programs. Another challenge is reconciling the Cleveland program’s intent and purposes (supposedly to give low-income parents an alternative to poorly performing public schools) with current implementation practices. A study found that just one-fifth of voucher pupils left public schools in Cleveland, and that one-third of students using vouchers for private-school tuition "had already been enrolled in a private school before receiving the publicly funded benefits" (Fine 2001). According to a senior researcher at Policy Matters Ohio, the nonprofit group that conducted the study, "the numbers suggest that vouchers in Cleveland are serving more as a subsidy for students already attending private schools than as a way for students to leave badly performing schools" (Fine 2001). Despite critics’ claims that the study raises new constitutionality concerns, state officials do not "believe the program is disproportionately benefiting private school students." Management Mobilizations in Milwaukee. John Witte (1999), commissioned to conduct a five-year evaluation of the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program, gave the program high marks for its original design, which succeeded in attracting very poor, mostly minority families whose children were not performing well in the public schools. Parents were satisfied with their children's new private (nonparochial) schools, and the private schools benefited by becoming more solvent and, in some cases, converting to public charter schools. For Witte, the program had four somewhat negative aspects: loss of better-educated, active parents for public schools; a 30 percent student attrition rate from the private schools; closure of four private schools; and unremarkable test scores. Witte found little empirical support for the legislature's expansion of the program in 1995 to include religious schools and serve 15,000 students (including some K-3 students already attending private schools). Witte believes the legislature may be tempted to expand the program further to embrace non-Milwaukee and higher income families. Effect of Public Vouchers on Private SchoolsVoucher plans' effects on private schools cannot be ignored. Currently, the United States provides private schools with very limited kinds of assistance—state aid for busing, books, and auxiliary services, and special federal programs for disabled and disadvantaged students—and regulates them lightly, compared with many other countries (Center on Education Policy 1999). Acceptance of public funds is usually accompanied by government regulation and increased paperwork (Adelsheimer). States or the federal government would have to hold private schools accountable for their use of public funds; ensure equitable, nondiscriminatory educational and administrative practices; protect parents from profiteers; and ensure that students receive an adequate education (Center on Education Policy 1999). Currently, neither Florida private schools nor the Catholic Archdiocese of Milwaukee have to report voucher students' test scores—a practice that is likely to change in an accountability-prone era (Bracey 2000). Private schools do not have to administer the same standardized tests as public schools or hire college-educated teachers. They are not subject to open-meeting or open-records laws, nor must they provide the public with data on suspension, expulsion, or dropout rates; teacher certification, salaries, or benefits; or the education of bilingual and special-education students" (Miner 2000, Kennedy 2001). The vast majority of private schools are sectarian. As of fall 1997, there were 27,402 private elementary and secondary schools in the United States, of which 48 percent are Catholic, 30 percent are other religious, and only 22 percent are nonsectarian (U.S. Department of Education 1997). As one public-policy professor points out (Kennedy 2001), "any voucher program purporting to give students and their parents significant ‘choice’ must invariably include pervasively sectarian institutions"—a significant constitutional roadblock for voucher proponents, who view vouchers as an updated K-12 version of the GI Bill. Myron Lieberman (2001) points out that denominational schools predominate in voucher plans because "free" public schools’ enjoy an unfair competitive advantage over nondenominational schools that parents would have to pay for. Parochial schools are not true competitors, however, as they offer a type of education unavailable at public institutions. Implementation of voucher programs (as in Milwaukee) may be hampered by some private schools’ midyear school closings, student attrition, unstable finances (Witte 1999). A common eligibility requirement for voucher recipients is participation in government free/reduced-price lunch programs—a problem for private schools that do not participate (Mandell 1999). Milwaukee parochial schools are coping with increased growth and more intrusive accountability and admission standards. Some applicants may be overlooked in favor of kids backed by $4,900 vouchers (Fuller and others 1999). In some areas, voucher amounts are too small to cover the costs of private-school tuition. Florida private schools with relatively high tuition, for example, may not wish to accommodate kids with $4,500 vouchers (Elam 1999). More information is needed concerning private schools' capacity and willingness to accept diverse student populations. A U.S. Department of Education study that surveyed private schools to discern their willingness to relieve overcrowding in urban public schools uncovered statistics with implications for voucher programs (Muraskin 1998). Fully 73 percent of nonpublic schools are not interested in accepting special-needs students; 92 percent would accept student transfers only if "allowed to maintain their current admissions, curriculum, and religious-instruction policies." Effect of Vouchers on Public SchoolsProponents of vouchers (and of school choice in general) claim that competition with private schools will spur public schools to perform at a higher level in an effort to satisfy parents and students and keep them from fleeing to private schools. Opponents counter that, in the competition for students, private schools will siphon from public schools their best students (and the per-pupil funding that accompanies them), leaving those schools in worse condition than before this free-market "reform" was enacted. Caroline Minter Hoxby (2001), a professor of economics at Harvard University, notes that "only in one city, Milwaukee, and in two states, Arizona and Michigan, have the new choice reforms created truly fluid education marketplaces for a sustained period." Her data from those three locales show that public schools respond favorably to competition. "In Milwaukee," she states, "schools facing more competition from vouchers improved at rates faster than schools facing little or no competition from vouchers." The positive effect of competition was evident in every subject area tested. Fourth-grade math scores, for example, rose by about 7 percentile points per year in the schools facing most competition, compared with just 4 percentile points in the schools in the control group. John Q. Norquist (2002), the mayor of Milwaukee, testifies that his city’s voucher and charter-school programs have "brought higher achievement, fostered diversity and contributed to urban renewal." Pointing to improvements throughout the Milwaukee education systems that have come about since the city embarked on school choice, Norquist, a Democrat, rejects the claim that vouchers help private schools at the expense of public schools:
Two econometric studies that examined competition and feasibility issues cast an unfavorable light on voucher plans. The first, examining whether vouchers increase educational quality in public and private schools, found vouchers' effects to be ambiguous, even when controlling for "budget-maximizing administrators" (Rangazas 1997). Across models and alternative plans, "vouchers will remove those households with the greatest willingness and ability to pay for education, leaving households behind who are less responsive to changes in public-school quality. This means public-education providers are likely to become less, not more, efficient." The second study, which probed costs of educational voucher systems, made "ballpark" estimates in five cost areas: accommodating additional students, recordkeeping, student transportation, information to parents, and dispute adjudication (Levin and Driver 1997). These estimates suggest that "the public costs of a voucher plan in a representative U.S. context could raise public educational costs by 25 percent or more" (Rangazas 1997). Voucher Programs' Cost-EffectivenessProponents claim that voucher plans use "education dollars more efficiently than public schools," because of many private/parochial schools' lower per-unit costs and because "private schools can choose not to admit children with disabilities and special learning needs" (Fuller and others 1999). Since private sectarian schools are heavily subsidized, vouchers only cover part of tuition and other costs (Southwest Educational Development Laboratory 2000). According to Policy Analysis for California Education (PACE) researchers, the Cleveland program refutes such cost-effectiveness claims. Although the voucher unit cost is $1,763, additional costs for transportation, administration, and two ancillary state-aid programs bring the total to $3,192—comparable to the cost of regular public-school education. A study by Jay Greene and others (1997) brings estimated per-pupil costs to $6,507. This figure "includes average K-12 expenditures after costs have been factored in for expensive categorical programs, like special education or compensatory reading programs—efforts which don't operate in voucher-supported private schools" (Fuller and others). Barbara Miner (2000), editor of the Milwaukee-based journal Rethinking Schools, claims that the Milwaukee voucher program is draining money and support from public schools. The $39 million program "is not funded separately but comes directly out of state dollars that would otherwise go to public schools." Meanwhile, the state has also imposed spending limits on public schools, leading to a $31 million deficit in 1999-2000. Under Current Wisconsin law, "school districts may raise local property taxes to help pay for the voucher program, but cannot raise taxes similarly to meet the needs of public schools" (Miner 2000). Economist Henry Levin (1998) suggests that the cost of a public voucher system may actually exceed the cost of the present system. According to his analysis of Milwaukee’s program, private schools with voucher students received for the 1996-97 school year about $1,000 more per student than did comparable public schools. Levin calculated that the cost of a national voucher program open to all students and providing all public-school services would cost taxpayers about $33 billion yearly. The "costs of accommodating additional students in private schools, record-keeping and monitoring, and providing transportation would… bring the total to $73 billion, about 25 percent of the current cost of public education nationally" (Levin 1998). In addition to assuming increased regulatory duties for a voucher program, the state would also have to open parent-information centers, establish an adjudication system to mediate interschool disputes, and set up a student-eligibility monitoring and assessment system. School certification systems would likely expand, along with pressures to fund student transportation, as Levin suggests (Fuller and others 1999). Policy Issues and RecommendationsObjective research studies on public vouchers are still needed. As WestEd researchers have observed, "virtually no studies conducted to date are credible to both sides of the issue" (Adelsheimer 1999). Collaborative, large-scale, multiyear studies that use methodologies approved by advocates and opponents would be invaluable. The National Research Council plans to conduct a ten-year, large-scale examination of voucher programs (White 1999). Paul Peterson (1999), who has evaluated private voucher programs in several cities, believes these pilot projects can contribute a great deal to scholarship and ongoing discussions about school choice, regardless of sector. WestEd researchers offer other recommendations, such as the importance of educating the public about alternative school-choice options, considering the true costs of administering voucher programs (including compensating public schools for loss of students), and designing programs to further educational and future employment opportunities (Adelsheimer 1999). Planners must address voucher amount and availability, selection of recipients, dissemination of information, engagement of nonchoosers, racial/ethnic balance, provisions for special-needs students, and transportation. Arguments for Progressive Voucher PoliciesMatthew Miller (1999) recommends that teacher unions embrace choice innovations as a catalyst for improving public education and that conservative voucher advocates relinquish their money-saving motivations. Claiming support from Milton Friedman, the NAACP, Lamar Alexander, and assorted liberals, Miller advocates furnishing poor, innercity kids and failing local public schools with vouchers based on basic per-pupil costs plus 20 percent. This progressive approach, Miller believes, will "pursue the benefits of vouchers without risk to the poor." However, Miller's "grand bargain" idea made little headway at a March 2000 conference for advocates and opponents sponsored by the Annenberg Policy Center at the University of Pennsylvania. Two other experts have also advanced a liberal case for vouchers. Harvard University professor and researcher Paul Peterson (1999) believes that "vouchers have the potential to improve socioeconomic and racial integration, as long as they are generous enough to cover most of the tuition and… schools are prohibited from racial or ethnic discrimination in admissions." As Peterson point out, public schools are already "plagued by vast inequalities," despite decades of finance reforms and three decades of busing programs. Robert Reich (2000), former U.S. Secretary of Labor, takes Peterson’s argument further in a Wall Street Journal commentary. Like Peterson, he acknowledging the polarization between good and bad schools, due to residential/income segregation and inequitable tax base problems. Reich is convinced that the only way to "decouple poor kids from lousy schools is to give [them] additional resources, along with vouchers" and enable them and their parents to use them appropriately. Like Miller, he advocates a progressive, well-funded voucher system that will benefit recipients and also improve public schools, instead of draining their resources. Under Reich’s plan, "a child from America’s poorest 20 percent of families" would receive a $10,000 to $12,000 voucher; children from the next quintile would receive vouchers worth $8,000 to $10,000. According to Reich, both urban and suburban schools would actually compete for the hardest-to-teach students and would have enough funds to hire better-qualified teachers, start after-school programs, and buy new textbooks. Since implementing a progressive voucher system would probably mean pooling local property taxes from poor and affluent communities, he advises proponents and public-school reformers not to hold their breath. Some Criteria for Measuring Voucher ProposalsThe National Center for the Study of Privatization at Columbia University Teacher’s College, headed by Harry Levin, has established four criteria for judging voucher plans’ quality and integrity: the degree to which they offer (1) freedom of choice, (2) productive efficiency, (3) equity, and (4) social cohesion (Goldberg 2001). (The center seeks to be objective in its research methods; its studies of educational outcomes usually offend privatization advocates and opponents alike.) In a recent interview (Goldberg 2001), Levin says his primary concern is not determining the relative merits of private versus public schooling, but improving the welfare of disadvantaged students in New York and elsewhere. He believes no current research project or reform policy can work fast enough to rescue a constantly shifting population of low-achieving students trapped in unresponsive, financially distressed, innercity schools. Private Voucher and Scholarship PlansIn addition to government-funded voucher plans, which have been constrained by political and legal challenges, a number of privately financed voucher plans have emerged around the country. Beneficiaries include several thousand children from low-income families who receive grants covering about half the cost of private-school tuition. Funded by businesses, private foundations, and individual donors, these programs "are focusing public attention on the merits of Catholic, Baptist, Lutheran, Muslim, Jewish, and other religious schools" that are successfully and efficiently educating poor students in the same neighborhoods as their failing public schools (Meyerson 1999). Through the 1998-99 school year, spending on privately funded voucher programs had totaled $61 million. As of 1999, these programs were allowing 13,000 children in 39 cities to attend private/parochial schools of their choice (Meyerson 1999). Pioneer Programs: Founders and Philanthropic PhilosophiesThe earliest privately financed voucher plan was the Golden Rule Program in Indianapolis, established in 1991 by the Educational Choice Charitable Trust and inspired by insurance CEO J. Patrick Rooney (Fuller and others 1999). Rooney set the tone for the private-scholarship movement by limiting participation to less affluent families and covering only partial tuition—a "hand up" strategy designed to motivate parents to adopt "take-charge" attitudes and regard education as an investment (Meyerson 1999). Also, schools are free to exclude students not suited for their particular educational approach. By early 1999, the Golden Rule Program had spent $5.7 million on K-8 vouchers. It now offers lottery-awarded, half-tuition scholarships to over 1,700 Indianapolis children, with 4,200 on a waiting list (Meyerson 1999). Rooney's program caught the eye of James Leninger, a medical-supply company CEO, and Fritz Steiger, president of the Texas Public Policy Foundation. In 1992, they initiated the Children's Opportunity Foundation, which offered scholarships to low-income San Antonio kids. Aided by the Walton Family Foundation, Leninger and Steiger spread Rooney's idea to other cities and established CEO America, based in Benton, Arkansas, "to provide matching grants and support services to new voucher programs" in many cities, from Los Angeles to Chattanooga, Tennessee (Meyerson 1999). Michael Joyce, president of the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation, achieved the greatest public-policy success of all voucher philanthropists by founding PAVE (Partners Advancing Values in Education)—a scholarship program that led to Milwaukee's publicly funded voucher program serving 10,000 children (Meyerson 1999) (see Public Voucher Plans section). In contrast to the Wisconsin legislature's modest parental-choice program that featured only private nonsectarian schools, the PAVE initiative embraced religious schools and poorer children already attending private schools at their parents' expense. PAVE's popularity with parents spurred the state legislature to include these provisions in its 1995 program expansion (see Public Vouchers Section). Scholarship Program MilestonesThe "ABC-Giffen Scholarship Program is the first privately funded voucher program to provide scholarship opportunities to all the students from one school" (Fuller and others 1999). In 1997, philanthropist Virginia Gilder and other ABC (A Better Choice) founders offered a private-school scholarship (worth up to 95 percent of tuition or $2,000) to each of the 458 students attending Giffen Memorial Elementary School, which has... the lowest third-grade reading scores in Albany. In 1997, "the New York City School Choice Scholarships Program began awarding 1,300 scholarships of up to $1,400 to low-income students entering grades 1-5" (Fuller and others 1999). By spring 1997, 16,000 parents had signed up (Jacobson 1997). Jacobson, a magnet school parent and choice advocate, observes that this eleven-to-one ratio is "greater than the odds of getting into Stanford." In fall 1998, San Francisco Independent Scholars (SFIS) began offering $2,000 merit scholarships to 100 eighth-graders, based on grades, test scores, teacher recommendations, and essays (but not income) (Fuller and others 1999). Horizon Scholarships of San Antonio, Texas, was the first privately funded voucher program to offer scholarships to all low-income students in one school district—the predominantly Hispanic Edgewood School District (Fuller and others 1999). In 1998, Leininger and CEO America committed more than $50 million over 10 years to give every Edgewood child "access to any religious, secular private, or public school in the San Antonio area" (Meyerson 1999). Students are admitted on their own merit, and the program has been extensively studied by Paul Peterson of Harvard University (See below). The Children's Scholarship Fund: Charity, Capacity, and MotivationsThe brainchild of venture capitalist Theodore Forstmann and Wal-Mart heir John T. Walton, the Children's Scholarship Fund has become the nation's largest private scholarship program (Fuller and others 1999). In June 1998, these magnates "pledged $100 million in challenge grants for voucher programs and announced they would be recruiting local partners to match their contributions" (Meyerson 1999). The Children's Scholarship Fund received enough matching contributions to finance 40,000 four-year scholarships for the 1999-2000 school year in New Orleans, Los Angeles, Kansas City, Philadelphia, Dallas, Chicago, Minneapolis/St. Paul, Miami, New York, and the states of Michigan and Arkansas (Fuller and others 1999; Meyerson 1999). Most of the lottery winners were expected to choose Catholic elementary schools, with average tuition of about $1,500. By April 1999, low-income parents of 1.25 million children had applied for these scholarships. According to Terry Moe, Stanford University professor and voucher advocate, parents who sign up their children for scholarships are not necessarily dissatisfied with public schools but are expressing a "large, pent-up demand" for a kind of education they could not otherwise afford (Archer, April 28, 1999). Despite disclaimers by Forstmann, who says he supports public education but wants to encourage competition, many leading educators (such as American Federation of Teachers President Sandra Feldman) detect public-policy motives and an anti-public-education slant to private-scholarship campaigns. CEO America, which has given $50,000 grants to help launch private scholarship plans in half a dozen cities, also lobbies strongly for public voucher plans (Archer, May 28, 1997). As magnet-school parent Jacobson noted, large waiting lists for scholarships raise questions concerning the limits of private/parochial-school capacity (see Public Vouchers section) and of parental and charitable resources. In 1997-98, 200 scholarships in Milwaukee's PAVE program (see above) went unused by financially strapped parents who failed to raise matching funds (Archer, May 28, 1997). Philanthropic organizations might be challenged to spend $30 billion yearly to finance low-end private education for the 20 million children eligible for free or reduced-price lunches (Meyerson 1999). But 10 percent of these children could attend private schools at a cost of $3 billion yearly—a not unreasonable sum "in a country with $150 billion in annual charitable giving" (Meyerson 1999). Program Evaluations: New York and Other CitiesPaul Peterson's study of New York City's privately funded School Choice Scholarships Program (see above) found consistent, generally positive results regarding inclusion of low-income families, parent satisfaction and involvement, parental marital status and family size, race-ethnicity, and attrition and mobility (Adelsheimer 1999, Peterson and Myers 1998). Similar conclusions were drawn from later studies of private scholarship programs in Dayton, Ohio, and Washington, D.C. (Howell and Peterson 2000, Wolf and others 2000). A booklet by People for the American Way claims there are many inadequacies in Peterson’s work. Black children in New York City, for example, showed gains only in sixth grade, not lower grades as Peterson claimed and the averaged score implies. In the New York study, Harvard researchers found that low-income voucher students "in grades four and five who attend private schools score higher in math and reading tests after one year than do students in the control group" (Peterson and others 1999). Also, parents report improvements in school climate, fewer disruptive events, greater home/family communication, and more stress on homework completion in private than in public schools. The Harvard researchers’ third-year study showed significant gains in educational achievement by black students who took advantage of New York City’s privately financed scholarships to attend private schools (Mayer and others 2002). After three years in the program, the black students’ composite test scores (combining math and reading) were 9.2 percentile points higher than the scores of their peers in public schools. "Impacts of a voucher do not vary significantly by grade level," the researchers say. No effect of the voucher program was found for Latino students, however. The Harvard study of the CEO America-financed Edgewood Horizon Scholarship Program in San Antonio (see above) drew similar conclusions about low-income families' participation, minority representation, and parental satisfaction with private schools (Peterson 1999). The study also documented modest achievement-test gains compared with public-school counterparts. Although the Edgewood program did not "cream" students (90 percent of district students were poor enough to qualify for scholarships), parents who got vouchers are better educated and had higher aspirations for their children (Archer, September 29, 1999). Horizon reports that over 100 students who had been offered vouchers did not use their scholarships; many may be "in limbo" because no school would accept them (Archer, September 29, 1999). An investigation by a University of Texas (Austin) graduate student revealed that the CEO-America program sponsors targeted selected students and that parents used vouchers primarily to support religious education for their children (Mandell 1999). Problems arose with private transport, additional costs for books and uniforms, mandatory participation in fund-raisers, and lack of federal lunch programs. Mandell also found that several Edgewood schools were high-achieving, and that both voucher and public-school parents interviewed seemed satisfied with local public schools. Jay Greene’s (2001) investigation of a Children’s Scholarship Fund program in Charlotte, North Carolina, turned up positive results for students using a scholarship to attend private schools. Choice students scored 5.9 percentile points higher in the Iowa Test of Basic Skills math section and 6.5 percentile points higher in the reading section after one year than their public-school counterparts. Greene found smaller classes, minimal creaming and dumping, and high satisfaction levels among parents and students (mostly minority), despite the prevalence of "poorly funded, amenity-starved" facilities and lower teacher salaries. Possible Benefits for African-American StudentsAccording to a comparison of test results for scholarship programs in three cities (New York City; Dayton, Ohio; and the District of Columbia), African-American students may have the most to gain from private scholarship programs (Howell and others 2000). Considering the three cases together, researchers found positive effects for school vouchers "only on the average test performance of students from African American backgrounds. Black students who switched from public to private schools in the three cities scored after two years, on average, approximately 6.3 percentile points higher on the Iowa Test of Basic Skills than comparable blacks who remained in public schools" (Howell and others 2000). The research "also shows that the benefits are far greater in mathematics than in reading" (Archer, March 8, 2000). Black voucher students in grades 6-8 actually had slightly lower reading scores than did their public-school counterparts. Results also suggested it was "harder for middle-school students to adjust when transferring schools than for younger children" (Archer, March 8, 2000). Researchers could not explain why voucher students from other ethnic groups did not experience similar benefits from transferring to private schools. It is also difficult to know whether achievement gains for black students would emerge in large-scale voucher experiments (Goldhaber 2001). Tax Credits and DeductionsSupport is building for tax assistance for education costs, despite a long string of Congressional rejections of bills (since the late 1960s) that were designed to give families tax breaks on various private- or public-school expenses. The Bush Administration’s budget plan for fiscal 2003 calls for a federal income-tax credit of up to $2,500 for families wanting to transfer their children out of public schools identified as failing under criteria in the Elementary and Secondary Education Act. Taxpayers could use the credit to pay for half of the cost of tuition, fees, and transportation (for the first $5,000 in such expenses) incurred in sending their children to private or different public schools (Robelen and Walsh 2002). Taxpayer savings can come in two forms: a tax credit directly subtracted from the tax bill and a tax deduction—an indirect reduction of tax liability by lowering net taxable income (Fuller 2001). Both arrangements provide aid to private and church-related schools in a less direct way than do voucher plans (Elam 1999). In 1998, the Phi Delta Kappan/Gallup Poll began asking respondents what they thought about proposals for state-legislated tax credits that would permit parents who send their children to private or religious schools to recover total or partial tuition expenses. In 1999, the public favored tax credits to cover all tuition expense (75 percent in favor to 41 percent opposed); approval soared to 65 percent for the "partial tuition" question. Groups most enthusiastic about tax credits include public-school parents (79 percent) and public-school parents with "average" or underachieving kids (83 percent). Those who oppose tax credits are people 50 years or older and those with no children attending public schools. These same respondents, however, expect high accountability standards and liberal admission practices from private schools receiving public funds. State LegislationSince 1997, Minnesota taxpayers have enjoyed "income tax-credits of up to $2,000 per family to pay for computer equipment, tutorial services, and other educational costs" excluding private-school tuition (Johnston 1997). Although a 1971 Minnesota tax credit was overturned by courts in 1974, a 1955 tax-deduction law has withstood Supreme Court scrutiny and is still in effect. In the late nineties, the program was revamped to include increased deduction levels and an education tax credit (Fuller 2001; Johnston 1997). Despite numerous challenges, Iowa has retained a 1987 tax credit/deduction of $50 for offsetting tuition or textbook expenses (Fuller 2001). In 1997, the law was revised to include a $250 tax credit, removal of a $45,000 income limit, and public-school extracurricular activity costs (Ziebarth 1999). In 1997, the Arizona legislature enacted a $500 tax credit for contributions to charitable organizations that provide private-school scholarships or grants to nondiscriminatory private and parochial schools, "as well as a $200 credit for extra-curricular expenses" (Fuller and others 1999). In January 1999, the Arizona Supreme Court upheld the tax-credit bill, which had been challenged a year earlier by the Arizona Education Association (Fuller and others 1999). In October 1999, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to consider a subsequent AEA appeal of Arizona's tax-credit scheme (Walsh, October 13, 1999). In September 2001, two Washington groups issued "dueling reports… on Arizona’s 4-year-old tuition tax-credit program (Bowman 2001). The Cato Institute, free-market think-tank, praised the program for offering parents choices while saving taxpayer dollars; the People for the American Way criticize the program for not being based on need and being aimed primarily at kids already attending private schools. From 1998 to 2000, "Arizona’s tax credit generated roughly $32 million for more than 30 scholarship organizations" and subsidized 19,000 (private) scholarships (Bowman 2001). In Florida, the House approved a measure that "would allow corporations to redirect up to 75 percent of their corporate income taxes to nonprofit organizations that award scholarships to low-income public-school students" (Sandham 2001). Students could get up to $4,000 to cover tuition at private schools, including religiously affiliated ones. The Senate has proposed a similar measure. If approved by Governor Jeb Bush, either measure could extend a program now offering taxpayer-financed tuition to students attending "failing" schools for two out of four years. About 12,000 Tampa students are on a waiting list for scholarships from Children’s Scholarship Fund—a program that could benefit from the proposed legislation (Sandham 2001). Comparing Voucher and Tax-Credit ProgramsIn a comparison of vouchers with tax-credit programs, Coulson (2001) favors tax credits as most equitable and effective at implementing market-driven freedoms and incentives. He claims that tax credits offer "greater resistance to new regulation," decrease "the risk of fraud and corruption," and avoid "problems arising from state funding of religious schools." According to Coulson, universal voucher programs "effectively guarantee funding to all needy families, but dramatically increase the risk of government intervention." Targeted programs would serve the poorest families, but provide financial disincentives for middle- and upper-income families to select private schools. Tax Subsidies: Access, Equity, and Policy IssuesLike voucher advocates, tax-subsidy proponents say that providing state aid to parents, not school bureaucracies, will mobilize competitive market forces and improve overall educational quality (Fuller and others 1999). However, instead of "targeting aid to low-income families," tax credits "usually benefit parents with significant tax liabilities," and they require a sophisticated understanding of tax law. Tax deductions are even more problematic, since most families do not itemize deductions. According to the report by Policy Analysis for California Education, it is difficult to predict how families will react to tax deductions or credits. A 1985 Darling-Hammond study found that "the deduction does not appear to be a powerful tool for equalizing school choice-making ability" (Fuller and others 1999). Data from Iowa and Minnesota (tax-subsidy states) show that private-school enrollment has actually declined slightly each year from the mideighties to the late nineties. Tax subsidies will not necessarily increase public/private school competition, as claimed by proponents (Fuller and others 1999). Instead of "increasing their capacity to educate greater numbers of students," private schools might respond to such incentives by boosting tuition levels and educational quality (Fuller and others). Frank Monahan (1999), an advocate of tax-credit legislation to benefit Catholic schools, suggests that such legislation must ensure a "broad class of beneficiaries as the best protection against a constitutional challenge in the courts." The tax credit or deduction "should be made available to all citizens who educate their children," in whatever institution, and not linked only to tuition costs. Such approaches have generally failed in state legislatures, because of anticipated high costs. Tax credits have several benefits, according to Monahan. Granting tax relief to individual citizens will probably stave off heavy government regulation of private schools. Additionally, a strong argument can be made for "tax fairness and justice for nonpublic school parents who both support the local school system with their taxes and save states billions of dollars by relieving them of the responsibility for educating their own children" (Monahan 1999).
|
